



Pragmatic Theory of Meaning 
Saleh Afroogh 
 
In this paper, I propose a pragmatic theory of meaning. In section 1, I clarify the distinction 
between meanNN and meanN proposed by Grice (1957), and I suggest a new distinction between 
linguistic and non-linguistic meanNN. In section 2, I shall explain Grice theory of meaning and 
criticize it. In section 3, I explain the classical theory of meaning and shall propose some 
consideration about it. Then, in section 4, I shall elaborate on the pragmatic theory of meaning, 
and I explore its difference with Grice theory of meaning as well as the classical theory of meaning. 
I also clarify the role of practical consequences in the pragmatic theory of meaning and will 
explain how it relates to Quine’s idea of the indeterminacy of translation.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
1-Meaning: natural, non-natural 
In his "Meaning," Grice starts his project by distinguishing two meanings of "meaning" and 
provides criteria for distinguishing these two meanings. The two meanings are natural meaning 
and non-natural meaning. The two notions, for Grice, capture many uses of "meaning," though 
not all notions of "meaning" might be categorized within the two above notions. Grice's 
paradigmatic examples of natural and non-natural meanings are respectively as follows: 
1- Those spots meanN (meant) measles. 
2- Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) meanNN that the bus is full. 
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According to Grice, the distinction between natural and non-natural meanings cannot be 
adequately captured in terms of natural and conventional signs, as might be ordinarily thought. He 
says: 
“This question about the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning 
is, I think, what people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction 
between “natural” and “conventional” signs. But I think my formulation is better. For 
some things which can meanNN something are not signs (e.g., words are not), and 
some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g., certain gestures)” 
(Grice,1957:379) 
 
Grice provides some criteria in order to distinguish the two notions of meaning: 
i. In cases of natural meaning, a sentence of the form “x means that p” entails p (that 
is, this notion of meaning is factive), so, for example, it is paradoxical to say that these 
spots mean measles, though there are no measles. But non-natural meanings are not factive: 
a sentence of the form "x means that p" does not entail p, so, for example, it makes sense 
to say that those three rings mean that the bus is full, though the bus is not indeed full. 
ii. The sentence “those spots mean measles” does not imply “what was meant by those 
spots was that he had measles," but the sentence "those three rings on the bell mean that 
the bus is full" does imply “what was meant by those three rings on the bell was that the 
bus is full." (In general, in cases of natural meaning, it does not make sense to infer from 
“x means that p” that “there is something that is meant by x," but in cases of non-natural 
meanings, we might do that.)  
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iii. From “those spots mean measles” it does not follow that “somebody meant by those 
spots that so and so”, but “those there rings on the bell mean that the bus is full” does imply 
that “somebody meant by the rings that the bus is full” (1957: 377-8). (In general, in cases 
of natural meaning, “x means that p” does not imply “there is someone who meant by x 
that p”, but in cases of non-natural meaning it does.) 
 
1.1- Linguistic meaningNN and non-linguistic meaningNN 
Grice says, "some things which can meanNN something are not signs (e.g., words are not), and 
some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g., certain gestures)” (Grice,1957:379). I think 
this implies a distinction with meaningNN which is not explicitly mentioned in Grice (1957), but it 
matters in our assessment of his theory: linguistic meaningNN and non-linguistic meaningNN that 
can be respectively explicated as follows: 
- If x is an utterance (such as a voice or a writing) of an appropriate type and 
it meansNN something, then x has a linguistic meaning. Grice’s sentence meaning is of 
this type. 
- If x is not an utterance of an appropriate type and it meansNN something, 
then x has a non-linguistic meaning. Grice's example of the bus's three rings is of this 
type. Another example would be body language, traffic signs, etc. I will come back to 
this more than twice.  
Accordingly, meaningNN is not reducible to linguistic meaningNN. It includes both kinds of 
linguistic and non-linguistic meaningNN. I will come back to this distinction soon. 
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2- Grice theory of meaning and reductionism 
In sentences of the form “x means that …” where x is a linguistic expression, “means” is non-
natural. Grice seeks to account for the distinction between sentence meaning and utterer meaning 
by explaining non-natural meaning. Grice analyzes sentence meaning in terms of speaker meaning, 
and he further accounts for the latter in terms of the utterer’s intentions. His account is, therefore, 
reductive in two respects: it involves a reduction of sentence meaning to utterer meaning, and a 
reduction of utterer meaning to her communicative intentions. 
 
In his “Meaning”, Grice formulates non-natural meaning in three levels: 
(1) “x (utterance type) meansNN (timeless) something” and “x (utterance type) 
meansNN (timeless) that so-and-so”  
(2) “x (utterance token) meansNN something” (on a particular occasion) and “x 
(utterance token) meansNN that so-and-so” (on a particular occasion) 
(3) “Speaker S meansNN by x (utterance token) something” (on a particular occasion), 
“S meansNN by x (utterance token) that so-and-so” (on a particular occasion). 
By (1) and (2), Grice wants to pick out semantic and a particular sentence's meaning, and by 
(3) utterer meaning. (3) is more fundamental for Grice—he seeks to analyze the other two in terms 
of (3). (2) Delivers utterer meaning if we add to it the person by whom it is meant so and so. And 
(1) can be analyzed in terms of utterer meaning if paraphrase it as follows: "people usually mean 
by x that so and so." The idea is those sentence meanings are what utterers usually mean by 
sentences. 
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The second stage of Grice’s project is to reductively explain utterer meaning in terms of his 
or her communicative intentions—this is psychological reduction: utterer meaning reduces to their 
psychological states, in particular, intentions. 
Here is Grice’s ultimate definition of utterer meaning in his 1957 paper: 
By uttering x, a speaker, S, meansNN something if and only if S utters x by intending 
(a) that uttering x by S produces a certain response, r, in a certain audience, A, 
(b) that A recognizes S’s intention, that is (a), 
(c) that A’s recognition of S’s intention is at least some part of A’s reason for r,1 
 Which are called M-intentions.  
Accordingly, Grice starts with two distinguished usages of the term ‘meaning’ he calls natural 
meaning (MeaningN) and non-natural meaning (MeaningNN) and he includes sentence meaning 
under the head of non-natural meaning. Then, he suggests that we can analyze the meaning of 
sentences based on speaker (utterer) meaning; Furthermore, he argues, in a reductionist manner, 
that the utterer's meaning should be explicated in terms of utterer's intentions (M-intentions). 
Actually, in his account, we see two reductive stages, that of sentence meaning to utterer meaning 
and that of utterer meaning to utterer's intentions. 
 
2.1- Some considerations on Grice theory of meaning  
As I explained, meaningNN is not reduceable to only a linguistic one. MeaningNN will include 
both linguistic and non-linguistic MeaningNN. Grice almost ignores this distinction in his theory 
and it leads to a significant misunderstanding in his theory. Grice would analyze the sentence 
 
1 In his 1969, Grice replaces (c) by the condition that the utterer intends that A satisfies (a) by satisfying 
(b). 
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meaning based on the utterer's intentions. He again ignores the fact that utterer or speaker's 
intentions can not be exhausted by linguistic meaningNN, i.e., sentence meaning. A speaker might 
have some intention, which she will convey through gestures or body langue. She might use some 
contextual tools to transfer some meaning to her audience. She might do some performance, dance, 
pantomime, or painting, etc., to convey his intended meaning. There might be some kind of 
meaning which is not possible to be transferred linguistically because they are not that structural 
to be expressed by language. Some other kinds might be linguistically transferable; however, it 
requires a lot of linguistic clarification and speech, which might be boring; so the speaker prefers 
to use some non-linguistic tools to convey or make meaningNN. Still, some other ones might be 
linguistically transferable; however, the speaker simply doesn't want to do that. Sentence meaning 
is only one tool for conveying meaningNN. I will elaborate more on the meaning-making process 
using non-linguistics tools in section 4, and on sentence meaning in the next section.  
 
3-Linguistic meaningNN: sentence meaning  
Grice will reduce sentence meaning to the speaker's intentions. This is false, and it is one of 
the negative consequence of Grice’s ignoring the distinction of linguistic and non-linguistic 
meaningNN (From now on meaning). Sentence are tools (and not the only tools at work) to convey 
meaning. Sentences are communicative tools. If so, a communicative tools would be effective only 
if it includes some objective or at least intersubjective (shared subjective). Otherwise, it can not be 
used as a communicative tool due to the fact, it does make any sense for other people (here, other 
language users.) So, sentence meaning can not be reduced to the speaker's intentions, and it doesn't 
need to be so. Think of a non-linguistic tools like a bus, which transfer the passengers. Is it 
necessary for me to own a bus, if I want to go to someplace by bus?! What matters about the tools 
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are their functions, which we expect from them. We simply use sentences (with their meaning) as 
a linguistic tools, which are some common objective or intersubjective one. Gricean sentence 
meaning is pretty subjective and not necessarily even intersubjective because nobody necessarily 
knows about the speaker's intentions. Speaker’s intentions are not shared.  
 
3.1- Classical theory of semantic (on sentence meaning) 
According to the classical theory of semantics, every expression has content or meaning, 
which leads us to a referent. The term “apple” has a meaning which leads us to actual fruits on 
apple three –its referents. Some indexical terms, like "I," "this," or "here," dont have any specific 
content out of context; they have no specific referent out of context as well. They are ambiguous, 
to some extent. We use these terms to refer to many extensions. "I" can be used to refer to Grice, 
me, Philp (my friend,) you, etc. in a different context. According to the classical theory of semantic, 
“I” has only some character, which is a function, which determines the specific content, like 
Philip, given the context of the speaker. As Speaks (2019) explains: 
“The obvious existence of such expressions shows that a semantic theory must do more 
than simply assign contents to every expression of the language. Expressions like “I” must 
also be associated with rules which determine the content of the expression, given a context 
of utterance. These rules, which are (or determine) functions from contexts to contents, are 
called characters.“ 
 
Moreover, those content, which seemingly is not ambiguous, are relative to circumstance. “the 
reference of expression must be relativized, not just to a context of utterance, but also to a 
circumstance of evaluation—roughly, the possible state of the world relevant to the determination 
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of the truth or falsity of the sentence. In the case of many simple sentences, context and 
circumstance coincide; details aside, they both just are the state of the world at the time of the 
utterance, with a designated speaker and place.” (Speaks, 2019) However, for example, the 
sentence, which refers to some possible worlds, shows that they can be apart. Look at the following 
one: 
 
- In a world with two planet earth, I prefer to live in the other earth. 
 
Here, the content of “earth” is ambiguous. It doesn't simply refer to our actual planet earth. 
The things which will determine the specific content and referent of “earth” is called circumstance. 
Accordingly, a character’s content would be determined by context, and a content’s referent would 
be determined by circumstance. So, according to the classical theory of semantics, sentence 
meaning just is two functions: 
 
- Character: which is a function from contexts to contents  
- Content: which is a function from circumstances to a referent 
 
3.2- Three considerations on the classical theory of semantic (on sentence meaning) 
a- According to the classical theory of semantic, “I” is indexical, that is “a linguistic 
expression whose reference can shift from context to context.” that is, “I”’s meaning or content is 




3- I am a student. 
4- I is a subject pronoun. 
 
“I”’s content in 3 is relative to context and would be ambiguous out of a specific context. For 
example, if 3 is written on a wall on a street, it would be pretty ambiguous. So, “I” in 3 is indexical. 
However, in 4, “I” is not ambiguous, even if it is written on a wall on a street (which lacks a 
context). It (in 4) has a specific content of "first-person-subject-pronounces-ness." Its content is 
pretty clear and is not relative to contexts. So, "I" in 4 is not indexical.  
I believe that we can explain the indexicality/non-indexicality of “I” in 3 and 4, based on the 
distinction of intensional/extensional sense and linguistic usages. In 3, “I” is used in its extensional 
sense, which refers to external referents or the relevant concepts. However, in 4, “I” simply and 
only refers to the intensional sense of “I,” which can be grasped by “first-person-subject-
pronounces-ness” 
 
b- According to the classical semantic theory, “apple” is not ambiguous. “apple” is not 
indexical. It has some specific content in each context. Look at the following sentences: 
 
5- Apple is fruit. 
6- I ate an apple. 
 
 “Apple" in 5 is not indexical, that is, the referent of "apple" is fixed in all the context, in which 
this sentence is uttered. Even if you see the sentence 5 on a wall on a street, its meaning or content 
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is pretty clear. The content or meaning of "apple" in 5 is not relative to context. “apple” here refers 
to the universal concept of "appl-ness" irrespective of the referents. 
However, “apple” in 6 is indexical. Its content might shift from context to context. If I say 6, 
“apple” refers to a yellow apple. If you say 6, it might refer to a green apple, etc.  
I believe that we can explain the indexicality/non-indexicality of “apple” in 5 and 6, based on 
the distinction of intensional/extensional sense and linguistic usages. In 6, “apple” is used in its 
extensional sense, which refers to external referents or the relevant concepts. However, in 5, 
“apple” simply and only refers to the intensional sense of “apple,” which is the general singular 
term relevant to the universal concept of “apple-ness.” 
Therefore, in spite of the classical semantic theorists, those content, which seemingly is not 
ambiguous, are ambiguous as well, and can be indexical in some cases. So, almost all of the linguist 
terms are ambiguous in some sense and some extent, and they all include a kind of indexicality. 
Likewise, the content/character functions, which was dependent on the distinction between 
indexical/non-indexical term is undermined. I will come back to this point in the next section. 
 
c. classical theories of meaning pay attention more to sentence meaning and less to world 
meaning. However, they almost ignored the speaker’s meaning, which includes the speaker's 
intentions, as I explained in section 2.1. It is not reducible only to linguistic or sentence meaning. 
It includes both linguistic and non-linguistic meaning.  
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3.3- What is sentence meaning? 
Classical semantic theories, distinguished between content and character based on the 
distinction between indexical and non-indexical terms. I showed that we have no terms as non-
indexical terms. Almost all words have some indexical usages and are so ambiguous. 
Moreover, I don’t believe that the content of linguistic worlds just are some “functions” from 
context or circumstance to the reference, or I believe this term (i.e., function) entails some 
misunderstanding. “Function” is a technical mathematical formal and abstract term, which has no 
content or material at all. However, all words have content, even the most ambiguous ones. “I” 
refers to “first-person-subject-pronounces-ness”. “Here” refers to "this-place-ness,"; exactly 
similar to some seemingly less ambiguous words like "apple," which is the relevant general 
singular term of “apple-ness.” 
One of the main motivations for Grice's theory of meaning was to deal with the challenge of 
indexical terms, which “has no referent”. So, by his reductivist theory, he wanted to give an 
explanation for sentence meaning in a context and based on the speaker's intentions. However, by 
refuting the indexical/ non-indexical distinction, I don’t need to his pretty subjective and mentalist 
theory of meaning. Moreover, refuting the “functional” conception of content paves the path for 
me to propose a more speaker-independent theory of sentence meaning. Sentence meaning is not 
just some functions, without any content, which so needs to be intended by some speakers. They 
are more objective or intersubjective than the speaker's pretty subjective intentions and beliefs. 
Sentence meaning has exactly some objective features that the sentence per se has. To shed light 
on it, let me give an example from non-linguistic tools. Think of a pencil and its function that is 
“writing on paper." Does it make sense that our knowledge about "pencil" is objective or 
intersubjective while our knowledge about its function, i.e., "writing on paper" be pretty 
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subjective?! Our knowledge about “pencil" and "writing on paper" is at the same level with respect 
to objectivity. The same seems pretty intuitive about our knowledge about the world "pencil" and 
its meaning, which is a general singular term relevant to "pencil-ness.” If so, our definition of 
sentence meaning would be the same as sentence per se regarding its dependency/independency 
to the speaker. Sentence meaning is only a linguistic tool like the sentence per se, which is 
intersubjective in a language society. I, as a language user, will use sentence and sentence meaning 
to convey my intended meaning, but I don't own (and don't need to do) the sentence meaning and 
sentences for communication, similarly that I don't need to own bus if I want to commute. 
Moreover, a sentence meaning which is defined based on the pretty subjective intentions of a 
speaker will be useful only for self-speaking, not communication. Linguistic tools are some 
effective communication tools, and it requires a fair level of intersubjectivity or objectivity, which 
is observed both in sentences and sentence meaning.   
Now, I owe you some responses to two important questions: first, what is the foundational 
theory of meaning or "In virtue of what facts about the speaker or community does a word have a 
relevant meaning?” and secondly, how we communicate our intended meaning while it is not only 
linguistic? (or put it in other words, what are the non-linguistic tools in virtue of them we convey 
our non-linguistic intentions in communications?)  in what follows, I will try to respond to these 
questions in terms of action and practical consequence of assertion in a context.   
 
4- A pragmatic theory of meaning: on perfect meaning (linguistic and non-linguistic)  
One of the main function of langue is communication. That is conveying our intended meaning 
to the audience. We can not convey our intentions only linguistically for several reasons; The most 
important one is that our langue is ambiguous, and it ought to be so. I mean, a language would be 
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effective only if it includes different kinds of universal terms, pronounces, general singular terms, 
general verbs, general adjectives, demonstratives, etc. The ambiguous of langue can be categorized 
as follows as well: sentence ambiguity, lexical ambiguity, syntactic ambiguity, etc. (Sennet, 2016)  
Now, imagine a language without ambiguity. Imagine that we had infinite different words to 
refer to an infinite example of apple in the world, and if I wanted to refer to the yellow apple in 
my hand I would say “apple-y-h" and if you wanted to refer to the green apple in you hand you 
would say "apple-g-h," etc. For sure, a langue with a one to one function between the words and 
referents will be much clear than our langue, which is not os. However, that language which 
naturally has infinite words, is pretty useless. We can not use such clear langue for communication 
due to the fact that we can not learn that language. Human langue is ambiguous in different ways, 
and it ought to be so if it is supposed to be effective and useful. (Piantadosi, 2012) but, how can 
we clearly convey our meaning using these ambiguous tools? 
The plausible response will be a comprehensive theory of meaning which is not restricted only 
to the linguistically expressible meanings. I will elaborate on the response using a theater example. 
In a theater, the actress, actors, director, etc., all want to convey their story and meaning that they 
have in their mind to the audience in a very effective and impressive way. They use different tools; 
dialogues, monologues, space-making, music, etc. they use many tools to convey their meanings 
in the best way to their audiences, and the most important part of their job is their actions. They 
try to give some meaning to audiences through two important things; their languages and their 
action and reactions. And because the langue is ambiguous, they determine the references of their 
language mainly by their actions and reactions.   
According to the practical theory of meaning, a speaker who wants to convey her intended 
meaning is an actress who uses all the available tools at the context to convey it properly. Certainly, 
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such performance is not as beautiful or effective as a real theater due to the fact that here the space 
and most of the tools are given, and not already determined properly. I, as a langue user, will create 
a stage of meaning using all tools, including my language and actions, to convey my intended 
meaning. I reconstruct a perfect meaningful stage in front of you based on my intended meaning. 
The main difference between the reconstructed meaning and my intended meaning is that the 
former is pretty objective or intersubjective, and the latter is pretty subjective and inaccessible for 
the audience. And the main voluntarily item which makes such a difference is my action. That is, 
my language is ambiguous and I will clear it up in an objective and observable manner through 
my action and call of reactions. 
There is some main difference between the pragmatic theory of meaning and the classical 
theory of meaning: 
- The pragmatic theory of meaning doesn't take the indexicals as some content-less 
expressions. 
- The pragmatic theory of meaning pays enough attention to the intended meaning of 
speakers and shows that speakers' intentions are not reducible only to the linguistic 
meaning or sentence meaning. 
- In the classical theory of meaning, terms are only some functions, which designate 
the referents through contexts and circumstances. However, they dont explain the facts 
which make it possible. They don't respond to the question of what the main item in a 
context will help the speaker to determine the reference of the ambiguous langue? And 
want facts to make it possible for audiences to understand it? According to the pragmatic 
theory of meaning, speakers use their actions and practical consequence of their assertions 
to make clear their ambiguous language' references.  
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Moreover, the main and substantial difference between the pragmatic theory of meaning and 
Grice' theory of meaning is that the former is not a pretty subjective and mental theory fo meaning. 
Grice definition of sentence meaning based on the speaker's intentions. The pragmatic theory of 
meaning, take sentence meaning, as objective as the sentences per se, and only as linguistic tools 
wich alone with other tools would lead the audience to the references.   
Kripke proposes, in Naming and Necessity (1972), that proposes a foundational theory of 
meaning for a proper name. He “suggested that the reference of a name could be explained in terms 
of the history of use of that name, rather than by descriptions associated with that name by its 
users. In the standard case, Kripke thought, the right explanation of the reference of a name could 
be divided into an explanation of the name’s introduction as name for this or that—an event of 
“baptism”—and its successful transmission from one speaker to another.” (Speaks, 2019) 
I am sympathetic to the core idea of Krilpe that there is some external item (for him causal 
chain) that determines the referent and clear the content of a proper name. However, I will add two 
things. First, the causal chain is only one kind of action/reaction or practical consequence of langue 
user's assertions. There are many other kinds of practical consequences as well. Secondly, I will 
extend this external practical approach in the definition of meaning to all words of a language not 
only the proper names.  
 
4.1- Practical consequences 
As I explained above, action and practical consequences play a central role in the pragmatic 
theory of meaning. The sentence meaning is the main linguistic tool, while the action is the main 
non-linguistic tool for conveying the speaker's intended meaning. Sentence meaning is ambiguous 
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and includes many ambiguous words, which all have some kind of indexicality. An effective 
langue ought to be ambiguous, however, an effective communication ought to be clear. Actions 
are the main tools that make clear the referent of our ambiguous language. In what follows, I will 
explain some kind of action or practical consequence, which helps us in a context to designate the 
referents. 
- Gesture and demonstrative: in many cases, we use, and ought to use some kind of 
pointing action to designate the referents. For example, whenever we use designators like 
"this," "those," we would clear the content of these words by point to certain objectives 
using gestures. 
- Facial status and eye movement:  in some cases, we show some specific meaning 
like being angry, happy, disappointed, etc., by kind of facial status and eye movements. 
- Body movement: whenever we talk with a person, we stand in front of her such that 
she is able to see our faces. So, we will make it clear who is my audience, and who I am 
talking with.  
- Voice related actions: We do shouting, screaming, slowly speaking, etc. when we 
talk with someone. In many cases, we convey the meaning of our sentence by changing the 
state of our voice.   
- Context selection or space-making: whenever I want to talk with some specific 
group of people in Chicago, I will go to Chicago, or make a connection with them. I don't 
go to California. I know that if I want to talk with those people and convey some meaning 





4.2- Practical consequences and Quine’ theory of translation 
Quine in “Two dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) undermine the following two suppositions 
of empiricism: 
1- Every sentence is either Analytic or Synthetic. 
2-  Every meaningful sentence is composed of some experimental data. 
According to Quine, these suppositions are true only if we have a plausible theory of 
“analyticity.” However, there is no such plausible theory. So, these dogmas are not true. Therefore, 
logical empiricism is not plausible. Quine examines several theories of analyticity and shows that 
most of them are circular. Quine shows that the concept of “synonym" per se depends on the modal 
concept of possible/necessary, which in turn is dependent on the meaning of analyticity. So, it 
would be circular. 
After refuting any plausible theory of synonym (and analyticity), and undermining the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, he states that all the propositions are dependent on kind of empirical 
data, and so could be false in some close or far possible word. He holds that we revise our 
interpretation and sentence emailing in a different context. Quaine skepticism about the meaning 
forms his idea of indeterminacy of translation. He holds that an exact and clear translation is 
impossible. We have different interpretations of the sentences and utterances. “For Quine, the 
criterion of successful communication, whether or not it involves translation, is fluent interaction, 
verbal and nonverbal” (Hylton, 2020). As he states: 
 “Success in communication is judged by smoothness of conversation, by frequent 
predictability of verbal and nonverbal reactions, and by coherence and plausibility of native 
testimony.” (Quine, 1992) 
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I don't talk about Quine’s metaphysical skepticism about meaning. However, my approach 
might entail in a kind of empathic skepticism about meaning. As I explained in the theater example, 
a speaker will convey the intended meaning through different tools, including two main ones of 
sentence meaning and action. Indeed, a speaker will create a stage of meaning and reconstructing 
the intended meaning in virtue of the tools on the stage. Then, an audience will receive her own 
meaning by looking at the stage. So, it might be said that it is not guaranteed that the speaker's 
intended meaning will be received by the audience correctly. However, as Quine refers to "verbal 
and nonverbal reactions," I believe that the most objective item in communication is action and 
reaction, which are clearly observable for all the language users in a context. The objectivity of 
the action not only leads all langue users to the exact and correct meaning but also make the 
communication effective and guarantees its correctness to a very good degree. What is meant by 
"verbal and nonverbal reactions" in Quine would be very close to what I meant by "practical 
consequence." In the pragmatic theory of meaning.2 
 
5- Conclusions 
I tried to explain the sentence meaning and its ambiguity, and I showed that speaker's intended 
meaning, which is not restricted to the linguistic-meaning, can be transferred by reconstructing a 
perfect stage of meaning in front of the audience in virtue of different kinds of tools; Two important 
of these tools are linguistic tools, i.e., sentence meaning and action. I clarified some kind of action 
and practical consequences, which help the langue users in clearing the ambiguous language and 
designating the referents. I can summaries my arguments in this paper in the following lines. 
(1) Every language would necessarily be ambiguous. 
 
2. For two related works on practical reasoning, see (Afroogh 2019, Afroogh 2021)  
 19 
(2) The ambiguity of a language entails that the sentence meaning is not clear enough for 
transferring a speaker's intended meaning; and it requires another external component outside the 
direct meaning of a sentence.  
(3) perfect intended meaning (in the communication) is not reducible only to linguistic 
meaning (i.e., a meaning, which would be transferred linguistically) 
(4) Actions and the practical consequences of assertions would satisfy that external 
requirement, which is out of the direct meaning of the sentence.  
(5) So, the perfect meaning in a communicative system would be pragmatic (i.e., it involves 
the practical consequences of the relevant proposition)  
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